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The number of smartphones in use globally has 
reached the 1-billion milestone in the third quarter of 
2012. It is projected that this number will double by 
2015 [1]. Meanwhile, smartphones are programmable 
and equipped with a set of cheap but powerful 
embedded sensors, such as accelerometer, digital 
compass, gyroscope, GPS, microphone, and camera. 
These sensors can collectively monitor a diverse 
range of human activities and surrounding 
environment. One can leverage millions of personal 
smartphones and a near-pervasive wireless network 
infrastructure to collect and analyze sensed data far 
beyond the scale of what was possible before, without 
the need to deploy thousands of static sensors. The 
term crowdsensing is coined specifically for this type 
of sensing paradigm [2].  
 
Realizing the great potential of crowdsensing, many 
researchers have developed numerous applications 
and systems, such as Sensorly [3] for making 
cellular/WiFi network coverage maps, Nericell [4] 
and VTrack [5] for providing traﬃc information, 
PIER [6] for calculating personalized environmental 
impact and exposure, and Ear-Phone [7] for creating 
noise maps. However, most of such systems are 
based on voluntary participation, which is not a fair 
model of crowdsensing for the users providing the 
information. 
 
When smartphone users participate in a crowdsensing 
task, they consume their own resources such as 
battery and computing power. The users also expose 
themselves to potential privacy threats by sharing 
their sensed data with embedded location tags. 
Therefore, an incentive-based model of crowdsensing 
would be fairer to the participating users. 
 
In this paper, the authors consider two main types of 
incentive mechanisms for crowdsensing systems: 
platform-centric and user-centric. In a more 
conventional platform-centric incentive based system, 
the total payment is set by the platform and users can 
only choose their actions accordingly. In systems 
adapting the user-centric incentive mechanism, a user 
sets a reserve price, the lowest price at which he is 
willing to sell a service, and the platform selects a 
subset of users that it can afford to pay them not 
lower than the specified reserve price. 
The paper presents important theoretical foundations 
for two incentive mechanisms under consideration, 
presenting proofs, algorithms, and approximations for 
optimal or near optimal behavior strategies of the 
platform and users. A set of desirable properties for 
such strategies is also provided with simulation 
experiments evaluating different parameters of the 
approximation algorithms. 
 
Platform-centric incentive mechanism is modeled 
after Stackelberg game [8], and, hence, finding 
optimal strategies for the platform and the users is 
reduced to efficient algorithms for computing 
Stackelberg Equilibrium. The authors provide proofs 
and algorithms for the platform to efficiently, with 
complexity similar to sorting, compute an optimal 
value of the overall incentive. Similar, an optimal 
strategy for the users is provided, which maximizes 
their payment when a known overall incentive value 
is set by the platform.  
 
For a user-centric incentive mechanism, the authors 
prove, using reverse auction model [9], that the 
problem of finding optimal strategy is NP-hard. 
Therefore, two approximation strategies are presented: 
Local Search-Based (LSB) and MSensing. Simulation 
experiments demonstrated that both strategies satisfy 
the following set of desirable properties: 1) 
computational eﬃciency: the platform is able to 
compute the outcome of the auction in polynomial 
time; 2) individual rationality: each honest 
participating user can expect a non-negative utility 
value; 3) proﬁtability: the value contributed by the 
selected smartphone users is not less than the total 
payment paid to the winning users; and 4) 
truthfulness: each smartphone user maximizes its 
utility by reporting its true cost. 
 
To summarize the overall contribution, the paper sets 
an important theoretical foundation for practical 
crowdsensing systems that want to utilize sensing 
capabilities of millions of smartphones. The authors 
consider platform-centric and user-centric models of 
incentive mechanism for motivating smartphones 
users to participate in crowdsensing. Necessary 
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algorithms and guidelines are provided that can help 
in designing efficient incentive-driven scalable 
crowdsensing applications. 
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